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EQUILIBRIUM IN THIN SECURITY MARKETS UNDER RESTRICTED
PARTICIPATION
MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS AND CONSTANTINOS KARDARAS
This is an incomplete version of the paper. Please do not refer to any of the results until the finalised version
becomes available.
Abstract. We consider a market of financial securities with restricted participation, in
which traders may not have access to the trade of all securities. The market is assumed thin:
traders may influence the market and strategically trade against their price impacts. We
prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium even when traders are heterogeneous with
respect to their beliefs and risk tolerance. An efficient algorithm is provided to numerically
obtain the equilibrium prices and allocations given market’s inputs.
Introduction
Motivation. Participation of traders in security markets is often limited or restricted, since
several factors may prevent individual or institutional investors from accessing certain assets.
This is the case, for example, for mutual and pension funds, which by law are not allowed to
hold certain instruments (for instance, bonds with low credit rates, over-the-counter deriva-
tives, securities in private placements, etc.), or hedge funds that choose not to trade in some
securities in order to emphasise the speciality of their investment strategies. Furthermore,
investors may avoid certain securities due to high transaction costs and margin requirements,
or due to the difficulty in processing information related to their payoff; see, for example, the
related discussion in [CG10] and the references therein.
Prompted by these aforementioned restricted participation considerations, several theo-
retical studies have developed equilibrium models assuming that traders’ portfolio sets are
restricted—see [AC09], [PS97], [CG10] and [HHP06] for exogenously imposed restrictions,
and [CGV09] and [CGES04] for endogenously arisen restrictions. These models assume a
competitive market structure: individual traders do not impact prices as part of the transac-
tions, and are essentially considered as price-takers. However, several empirical studies (see
for instance [RW15] and the references therein) have shown that large institutional investors
cover a large part of the market’s volume; therefore, their orders will influence the prices of
Date: August 20, 2019.
Key words and phrases. thin markets, restricted participation, limited participation, price impact, risk
sharing, Nash equilibrium.
1
2 MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS AND CONSTANTINOS KARDARAS
traded securities, and eventually allocations in the portfolios of all traders. Especially in mar-
kets with restricted participation, where trading involves less participants, assuming that the
investors (and in particular the large ones) have no price impact is not consistent with what
we observe in practice. In this paper, we assume that investors have possible participation
constrains, and recognise the impact they have to equilibrium prices. The assumption that all
traders’ actions have price impact essentially implies that only large investors participate in
the transaction of each security, in an oligopolistic market structure. The latter is effectively
consistent with (at least) the primary level of security trading.
Contribution and connections with existing literature. Our work is related to two
strands of literature on security equilibrium pricing. Firstly, we contribute to the ongoing
research on thin financial markets, where all traders are assumed strategic; secondly, our
results are linked to equilibrium models under restricted (or limited) traders’ participation.
More precisely, we adapt the standard CARA-normal model and as in [RW15], [Viv11],
[MR17], [Ant17] and study the equilibrium pricing and allocation of a bundle of securities
where the assumption of traders being price-takers is withdrawn. We suppose that traders’
actions impact prices and, therefore, securities allocation choice, and that traders act strate-
gically, through the demand schedules they submit in the transaction. The paper contributes
on this front of the literature by considering a model where
(1) traders are heterogeneous, not only concerning their risk tolerance, but also in their
beliefs (on expectations and on covariance matrices); and
(2) traders have restricted participation, in the sense that they do not necessarily have
access to the trade of all securities.
In such a setting, we consider a demand-slope game (as in [RW12], [RW15] and [MR17])
and prove the existence and the (global) uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for any traders’
participation scheme. (The only additional imposed assumption is that at least three traders
participate in the trading of each security. The latter is necessary for equilibrium to exist; see,
amongst others, [Kyl89] and [RW15].) Our main result, Theorem 1.4, also gives an iterative
numerical algorithm for fast numerical calculation of the equilibrium quantities. Theorem
1.4 can be seen as a generalisation of [RW15, Lemma 1] and of [MR17, Proposition 1, items
(i)-(iii)], in that traders are heterogeneous with respect to their risk aversions and their beliefs.
In the centralised market model of [MR17], traders have different risk aversions but share the
same view on the covariance matrix of the security payoffs.
Literature discussing models with limited participation (see, amongst others, [RZ09], [Zig04]
and [Zig06]) distinguishes market participants to arbitrageurs and competitive investors. Ar-
bitrageurs have access to all tradeable assets and act strategically in a Cournot-type of frame-
work, while investors are assumed price-takers. In our paper, all traders act strategically, even
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if some of them have access to all securities and others do not. Our model is hence more
appropriate when large investors know that they can influence the market even if they are
restricted to trade only a subset of the securities.
We further provide a simple example in §1.7, where all agents except one are homogeneous
and fully agree on the distribution of the securities’ payoffs, demonstrating that it is not
socially optimal to move from restricted participation to full participation in the presence
of price impact in the model. This is in start contrast with what happens in competitive
equilibrium, without price impact, when full participation is always optimal, since it leads to
a Pareto optimal allocation.
1. Equilibrium Price Impact with Restricted Participation
1.1. Traders, securities and notation. In the market, we consider a finite number of
traders and use the index set I to denote them. There are a finite number of tradeable risky
securities, and their index set is denoted by K. We model restricted market participation
by assuming that trader i ∈ I has access to (effectively, is allowed to trade in) only a subset
Ki ⊆ K of the securities; in other words, trader i ∈ I may select units of securities in the
subspace of X ≡ RK defined via
Xi := {x ∈ X | xj = 0, ∀ j ∈ K \Ki} , i ∈ I.
Before giving more details of the model’s structure, we need to establish some necessary
definitions and notation. For each i ∈ I, we shall denote by πi the projection operator
from X on the space Xi; for x ∈ X , πix has the effect of keeping all coordinate entries of x
corresponding to Ki intact, while replacing all coordinate entries of x corresponding to K \Ki
with zero.
Define S as the set of all symmetric linear nonnegative-definite forms on X . On S, define
the partial order  via
A  B ⇐⇒ (B −A) ∈ S.
Furthermore, for a subspace Y of X , let SY≻ consist of A ∈ S such that Ax = 0 for all
x ∈ X orthogonal to Y, and which are strictly positive definite on Y: if y ∈ Y is such that
〈y,Ay〉 = 0, then y = 0. (Throughout the paper, 〈·, ·〉 denotes standard Euclidean inner
product.) Note that B ∈ SXi≻ can be regarded as a K×K matrix where only the elements Bjℓ
with (j, ℓ) ∈ Ki ×Ki may be nonzero, and that πiB = B = Bπi holds whenever B ∈ SXi≻ . For
A ∈ SY≻ and B ∈ SY≻, we write A ≺Y B to mean that (B −A) ∈ SY≻. We shall denote by B−Xi
the unique element of SXi≻ which, on Xi, coincides with the unique inverse of B.
For k ∈ K, define Ik := {i ∈ I | k ∈ Ki} to be the set of traders that have access to trading
security k. A minimal requirement for any meaningful equilibrium model is that |Ik| ≥ 2, for
all k ∈ K. When we deal with price impact later on, we shall see that the stronger condition
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|Ik| ≥ 3, for all k ∈ K, is necessary and sufficient for existence (and uniqueness) equilibrium.
(Note that the necessity of the latter assumption on linear Nash demand equilibria is well-
known in the literature—see, for instance, [Kyl89] and [Viv11].)
The next simple linear algebra result will be used throughout the paper, sometimes tacitly.
Lemma 1.1. Suppose that |Ik| ≥ 2, for all k ∈ K. For fixed j ∈ I, if Di ∈ SXi≻ for all
i ∈ I \ {j}, then
(∑
i∈I\{j}Di
)
∈ SX≻ .
Proof. Set D−j :=
∑
i∈I\{j}Di. Let z ∈ X , and assume 〈z,D−jz〉 = 0. Then, 〈z,Diz〉 = 0 for
all i ∈ I \ {j}. Since Di ∈ SXi≻ , we have zℓ = 0 for all ℓ ∈ Ki, whenever i ∈ I \ {j}. Therefore,
zℓ = 0 for all ℓ ∈
⋃
i∈I\{j}Ki. But,
⋃
i∈I\{j}Ki = K, since we assume that |Ik| ≥ 2 for all
k ∈ K. 
1.2. Preferences and demand. Trader i ∈ I has preferences numerically represented via
the linear-quadratic functional
(1.1) Xi ∋ x 7→ Ui(x) ≡ ui + 〈gi, x〉 − 1
2
〈
x,B−Xii x
〉
,
where x represents units of securities held from the set Ki, ui ∈ R is the baseline utility of
trader i ∈ I, Bi ∈ SXi≻ and gi ∈ Xi.
Remark 1.2. A special case of preferences numerically represented by the functional in (1.1),
is when the latter coincides with the certainty equivalent of expected constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility, and payoffs have a joint Gaussian distribution—see, for instance,
[Kyl89], [Vay99] and [MR17]. We elaborate more on this in the next paragraph, in order to
enforce the point that, in our modelling framework, heterogeneity in multiple levels is allowed;
more precisely, our model shall allow for:
• heterogeneity in the traders’ risk aversions;
• heterogeneous in the traders’ subjective beliefs regarding the expectations and covari-
ance structure of the securities; and
• traders’ initial endowments which may not be spanned by the securities.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in a setting with restricted participation
which allows all of the above.
Let S ≡ (Sk; k ∈ K) denote the vector of securities, and Ei denote the random initial
position of agent i ∈ I. Assume that δi > 0 is the risk tolerance of trader i ∈ I, and the
vector (Ei, S) has a joint Gaussian law under the agent’s subjective probability Pi. Let Ci be
the covariance matrix under Pi of S, where only the components of Ki are regarded, and the
other entries are equal to zero. Assume that Ci ∈ SXi≻ . Furthermore, let ci ∈ Xi be the vector
whose entry k ∈ Ki is the covariance under Pi between Ei and Sk, and fi ∈ Xi denote the
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vector whose entry k ∈ Ki is the expectation under Pi of Sk. Finally, let the baseline utility
of agent i ∈ I equal
ui := −δi logEi
[
exp
(
−Ei
δi
)]
∈ R
Then, a position x ∈ Xi leads to certainty equivalent equal to
−δi logEi
[
exp
(
−Ei + 〈x, S〉
δi
)]
= ui + 〈x, fi − (1/δi)ci〉 − 1
2δi
〈x,Cix〉 ,
which is exactly of the form (1.1), with
gi := fi − 1
δi
ci, Bi := δiC
−Xi
i .
Note that the above measures utility in monetary terms, B−Xi captures jointly the trader’s
risk tolerance level δi and the covariance matrix of the securities.
1.3. Price impact. Under a competitive market setting, each trader i ∈ I is assumed to be a
price-taker; therefore, for any given vector of security prices p ∈ X , the aim is the maximisation
of the utility Ui(q) − 〈q, p〉, over demand vectors q ∈ Xi. However, and as emphasised in the
introductory section, there are several security markets where such a price-taking assumption
is problematic. Especially under a restricted participation environment as the one dealt with
here, the possibility that large investors may influence the market is more intense, and the
need arises to take into account the strategic behaviour of participating traders in the market.
We consider and analyse the concept of Bayesian Nash market equilibrium in linear bid
schedules, as has appeared in [RW15] and [MR17], among others. It is assumed that all
traders are strategic, and that no noise traders or traders without price impact are involved
in the transactions. We extend the one-round full participation game appearing in [RW15], in
that, in our setting, traders have heterogeneous preferences (both in risk aversions, as well as
on expectations and covariances), and do not necessarily have access to all the securities. On
the other hand, the decentralised market of [MR17] has richer structure on possible restrictions
for trading, but all traders have the same subjective views on covariances of the securities.
It is important to point out that, although traders may have access to only a subset of all
securities, their actions will impact the equilibrium prices of all the securities.
Below, we give the line of argument for the individual trader’s optimal allocation given
a perceived price impact. We follow [Wer11] and [RW15], assuming that traders perceive a
linear price impact of the orders they submit; more precisely, a net order of ∆q ∈ Xi for trader
i ∈ I will move prices by Λi∆q, where Λi ∈ S≻ is the so-called price impact (similar to Kyle’s
lambda [Kyl89]), and will be eventually endogenously determined in equilibrium. Let p˜ ∈ X
be a vector of pre-transaction security prices. Under the previous linear price impact setting,
an allocation q ∈ Xi for trader i ∈ I will cost 〈q, p〉 = 〈q, p˜+ Λiq〉, where p = p˜ + Λiq will be
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the actual transaction security prices. This means that the post-transaction utility of trader
i ∈ I will equal
Ui(q)− 〈q, p〉 = ui + 〈q, gi − p˜〉 − 1
2
〈
q,B−Xii q
〉
− 〈q,Λiq〉 .
Given Λi, each trader i ∈ I wants to maximise the above utility by choosing demand vectors
q from the subspace Xi, as there is no demand for securities that trader has no access to.
Therefore, with pre-transaction prices p˜, the optimisation problem that trader i ∈ I faces is
(1.2) qi = argmax
q∈Xi
(
〈q, gi − p˜〉 − 1
2
〈
q,B−Xii q
〉
− 〈q,Λiq〉
)
.
Since the above maximisation problem is strictly concave on Xi, we may use first-order con-
ditions for optimality, which give that gi − πip˜−B−Xii qi − 2πiΛiqi = 0; in other words,
gi − πi(p˜+ Λiqi) = B−Xii qi + πiΛiqi ⇐⇒ gi − πip = (B−Xii + πiΛiπi)qi,
where the fact that πiqi = qi holds (since qi ∈ Xi) was used. Note that the above first order
conditions are consistent with [MR17, optimisation relation (5)], adjusted to our restricted
participation setting. Since
(
B−Xii + πiΛiπi
) ∈ SXi≻ , upon defining
(1.3) Xi :=
(
B−Xii + πiΛiπi
)−1
∈ SXi≻ , i ∈ I,
and noting that Xiπi = Xi, we obtain that
(1.4) qi = Xigi −Xip.
To recapitulate: given a perceived linear price impact Λi ∈ S≻, and with Xi given by (1.3),
the relationship between the optimal allocation qi ∈ Xi of trader i ∈ I with actual transaction
prices p ∈ X is given by (1.4). In view of (1.4), the matrix Xi ∈ SXi≻ of (1.3) has the
interpretation of a negative demand slope for trader i ∈ I.
1.4. Equilibrium with restricted participation and price impact. Given the above
best response individual traders’ problem, we shall discuss now how price impact is formed in
equilibrium.
Assuming that each trader i ∈ I perceives linear price impact Λi ∈ S≻, and given the
relationship between the optimal allocation qi ∈ Xi of trader i ∈ I with transaction prices
p ∈ X given by (1.4) and Xi ∈ SXi≻ given by (1.3), the equilibrium prices p̂ that will clear the
market satisfy:
0 =
∑
i∈I
qi =
∑
i∈I
Xigi −
(∑
i∈I
Xi
)
p̂.
Given that
∑
i∈I Xi ∈ S≻ holds by Lemma 1.1, it follows that
p̂ =
(∑
i∈I
Xi
)−1(∑
i∈I
Xigi
)
.
EQUILIBRIUM IN THIN SECURITY MARKETS UNDER RESTRICTED PARTICIPATION 7
Given these equilibrium prices, the equilibrium allocation (q̂i; i ∈ I) will be given by substi-
tuting the above expression p̂ for p in (1.4).
Within equilibrium, each trader’s perceived market impact should coincide with their actual
ones; in this regard, see also [RW15, Lemma 1]. Assume that all traders, except trader i ∈ I,
have price impacts (Λj ; j ∈ I \ {i}), leading to (Xj ; j ∈ I \ {i}) as in (1.3). If trader i ∈ I
wishes to move allocation from q̂i to
(
q̂i+∆q
) ∈ Xi, the aggregate position of all other traders
has to change by −∆q, which would imply that new prices would equal p̂ + ∆p, where, by
(1.4),
−∆q +
∑
j∈I\{i}
q̂j =
∑
j∈I\{i}
Xjgj −
 ∑
j∈I\{i}
Xj
 (p̂+∆p) .
Given that ∑
j∈I\{i}
q̂j =
∑
j∈I\{i}
Xjgj −
 ∑
j∈I\{i}
Xj
 p̂,
we obtain that
∆p = X−1−i ∆q, where X−i :=
∑
j∈I\{i}
Xj .
It follows that Λi = X
−1
−i has to hold in equilibrium, for all i ∈ I. With the above understand-
ing, and recalling (1.3), we give the following definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1.3. A collection (X∗i ; i ∈ I) ∈ (S≻)I will be called equilibrium negative demand
slopes if
(1.5) X∗i =
(
B−Xii + πi(X
∗
−i)
−1πi
)−Xi
, i ∈ I,
where X∗−i :=
∑
j∈I\{i}X
∗
j , for all i ∈ I.
Given equilibrium negative demand slopes (X∗i ; i ∈ I) as above, the equilibrium price
impacts (Λ∗i ; i ∈ I) ∈ (S≻)I are given by Λ∗i = (X∗−i)−1, i ∈ I.
1.5. Main result. Recall that we assume that, in order to have a meaningful equilibrium
discussion, there are at least two traders for every security: |Ik| ≥ 2 holds for all k ∈ K. As
Lemma 2.2 shows, if |Ik| = 2 holds for some k ∈ K, then there exists no Nash equilibrium in
the sense of Definition 1.3. Therefore, the stronger condition |Ik| ≥ 3 for all k ∈ K is necessary
for Nash equilibrium; the next result shows that this condition is also sufficient for existence
of Nash equilibrium, and that it is unique.
Theorem 1.4. Whenever |Ik| ≥ 3 holds for all k ∈ K, a unique equilibrium (X∗i ; i ∈ I) in
the sense of Definition 1.3 exists. Moreover, for any initial collection (X0i ; i ∈ I) ∈
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ ,
if one defines inductively the updating sequence
Xni :=
(
B−Xii + πi
(
Xn−1−i
)−1
πi
)−Xi
, i ∈ I, n ∈ N,
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it holds that
lim
n→∞
Xni = X
∗
i , ∀i ∈ I.
Note that the above result not only guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium,
but also provides an iterative algorithm to numerically calculate the equilibrium demands
and price impacts, where the only inputs are the participation’s restrictions and matrices
(Bi; i ∈ I).
1.6. A limiting equilibrium. We consider the case where a trader approaches risk neutrality,
in the sense that the quadratic part of the trader’s utility is getting arbitrarily close to zero. We
show below that, as the preferences of this trader approach risk-neutrality, the corresponding
sequence of equilibria converges to a well-defined limit. The proof of Proposition 1.5 that
follows is given in §2.5.
Proposition 1.5. Let I = {0, . . . ,m}, where m ≥ 2. Consider a fixed (Bi; i ∈ I \ {0}), as
well as a nondecreasing sequence (Bn0 ; n ∈ N) with the property that
lim
n→∞
(Bn0 )
−X0 = 0.
If (Xn; n ∈ N) stands for the sequence of equilibria corresponding to (Bn0 ; n ∈ N), then
(Xn; n ∈ N) monotonically converges to a limit X∞ ∈ ∏i∈I SXi≻ . Furthermore, (X∞i ; i ∈ I)
solves the system
X∞i =
(
B−Xii + πi
(
X∞−i
)−1
πi
)−Xi
, i ∈ I \ {0} ,
X∞0 =
(
π0
(
X∞−0
)−1
π0
)−X0
.
In the context of Proposition 1.5, assume further that K0 = K, i.e., that trader 0 has access
to the whole market. We could interpret this trader as an asymptotically risk-neutral market
maker that gives prices to all the securities in the market. Assuming that market maker’s
preferences are (close to) risk neutral is common in the literature—see, e.g., [Kyl85], [FJ02],
[BGS05] and the references therein. In this case, we obtain
X∞0 =
((
X∞−0
)−1)−1
= X∞−0.
But then X∞−i = 2X
∞
−0−X∞i holds for all i ∈ I \{0}, by which we obtain that (X∞i ; i ∈ I \{0})
solves the system
(X∞i )
−Xi = B−Xii + πi
(
2X∞−0 −X∞i
)−1
πi, i ∈ I \ {0} .
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1.7. An example on social inefficiency. For the purposes of §1.7, assume that the are two
securities and four traders: K = {1, 2}, I = {0, 1, 2, 3}. We use directly the notation and
set-up of Remark 1.2, and assume that δi = 1 holds for all i ∈ I. Traders in I−0 = {1, 2, 3}
will be identical, and such that gi = 0 for i ∈ I−0, and Ci = C1 for i ∈ I−0, where
C1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
The covariance matrix of trader 0 is given by
C0 =
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
.
Lastly, set g0 = (γ1, γ2).
1.7.1. Restricted participation. Here, Ki = K for i ∈ I−0, while K0 = {1}. Write (Xri ; i ∈
I) for the solution to the system of equations, where the superscript “r” denotes restricted
participation. By symmetry, Xr1 = X
r
i holds for all i ∈ I−0. Noting that Xr1(i, j) = 0 whenever
(i, j) 6= (1, 1), we obtain the equations
1/Xr0 (1, 1) = 1 + (1/3)(1/X
r
1 (1, 1)),
Xr1 =
(
C1 + (X0 + 2X
r
1)
−1
)−1
.
In fact, one may directly check that these equations have the solution
Xr0 =
(
2/3 0
0 0
)
, Xr1 =
(
2/3 0
0 1/2
)
.
Therefore, prices at restricted participation equilibrium are given by pr = (Xr0+3X
r
1)
−1Xr0g0 =
(γ1/4, 0). This implies a position q
r
1 = −Xr1pr = −(γ1/6, 0) for agents in I−0, and a position
qr0 = −3g1 = (γ1/2, 0) for agent 0. It follows that the aggregate utility differential at restricted
participation equilibrium will equal∑
i∈I
(
〈qri , gi〉 −
1
2δri
〈qri , Ciqri 〉
)
= 〈qr0, g0〉 −
1
2
〈qr0, C0qr0〉 − 3
1
2
〈qr1, qr1〉 =
γ21
3
.
1.7.2. Full participation. Here, Ki = K for all traders i ∈ I. Write (Xfi ; i ∈ I) for the solution
to the system of equations, where the superscript “f” denotes full participation. By symmetry,
Xf1 = X
f
i for all i ∈ I−0, and we have the equations
Xf0 =
(
C0 + (3X
f
1 )
−1
)−1
Xf1 =
(
C1 + (X
f
0 + 2X
f
1 )
−1
)−1
Substituting the first to the second, we obtain
(Xf1 )
−1 = C1 + ((C0 + (3X
f
1 )
−1)−1 + 2Xf1 )
−1
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If we can solve the latter one, we then also have the value of Xf0 . We have
C0 = V
(
1 + ρ 0
0 1− ρ
)
V, where V =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
Note that V is unitary and symmetric V (V 2 = id), and therefore trivially diagonalises the
identity matrix C1. It then follows that V X
f
1 V will be also diagonal. To east notation below,
define the matrix
Dρ :=
(
1/(1 + ρ) 0
0 1/(1 − ρ)
)
,
so that C−10 = V D
ρV , and for functions h : (0,∞) → R write h(Dρ) for the 2 × 2 diagonal
matrix with diagonal entries (h(1/(1 + ρ)), h(1/(1 − ρ))). Then, one solves the above matrix
equation for Xf1 to obtain
Xf1 = V h1(D
ρ)V, where h1(x) =
1
4
− 5
12
x+
√(
1
4
− 5
12
x
)2
+
2
3
x, x ∈ (0,∞).
It then also follows from Xf0 =
(
C0 + (3X
f
1 )
−1
)−1
that
Xf0 = V h0(D
ρ)V, where h0(x) = (x
−1 + (3h1(x))
−1)−1 =
3xh1(x)
x+ 3h1(x)
, x ∈ (0,∞).
Prices at full participation equilibrium are given by
pf = (Xf0 + 3X
f
1 )
−1Xf0 g0 = V (h0(D
ρ) + 3h1(D
ρ))−1h0(D
ρ)V g0,
which gives, for agents in I−0, a position of q
f
i = q
f
1 , where
qf1 = −Xf1 pf = −V h1(Dρ)(h0(Dρ) + 3h1(Dρ))−1h0(Dρ)V g0 = V η1(Dρ)V g0,
where
η1(x) = −h1(x)(h0(x) + 3h1(x))−1h0(x) = − h1(x)
1 + 3h1(x)/h0(x)
= − xh1(x)
2x+ 3h1(x)
.
The position of agent 0 is qf0 = −3qf1 = −3V η1(Dρ)V g0.
The aggregate utility differential at Nash equilibrium in full participation will equal∑
i∈I
(〈
qfi , gi
〉
− 1
2δi
〈
qfi , Ciq
f
i
〉)
=
〈
qf0 , g0
〉
− 1
2
〈
qf0 , C0q
f
0
〉
− 31
2
〈
qf1 , q
f
1
〉
= g′0V κ(D
ρ)V g0,
where
κ(x) = −3η1(x)− 9
2
η21(x)
x
− 3
2
η21(x), x ∈ (0,∞).
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1.7.3. Comparison. It follows that the difference between utilities in full and restricted par-
ticipation equilibrium equals
g′0V κ(D
ρ)V g0 − 1
3
g′0
(
1 0
0 0
)
g0 = g
′
0V
(
κ(Dρ)− 1
6
(
1 1
1 1
))
V g0.
To see whether this may become negative, we calculate the smallest eigenvalue of
κ(Dρ)− 1
6
(
1 1
1 1
)
=
(
κ((1 + ρ)−1)− 1/6 −1/6
−1/6 κ((1 − ρ)−1)− 1/6
)
,
which equals
κ((1 + ρ)−1) + κ((1 − ρ)−1)− 1/3 +
√
(κ((1 + ρ)−1)− κ((1 − ρ)−1))2 + 1/9
2
A plot shows that this is (symmetric in ρ, of course, and) negative for values of ρ close to zero.
It follows that when ρ is not equal to zero, it may be not be socially optimal to move from
restricted participation to full participation when price impact is involved.
2. Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1.4 will be given in a series of subsections, starting with §2.1 and
concluding in §2.4. As already mentioned, §2.5 contains the proof of Proposition 1.5.
2.1. The fixed point equation. Let F :
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ 7→
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ be defined via
(2.1) Fi(X) =
(
B−Xii + πi(X−i)
−1πi
)−Xi
, i ∈ I.
According to Definition 1.3, the equilibrium negative demand slopes are given as the fixed
points of F , i.e., solutions to the equation
(2.2) X = F (X) ⇐⇒ Xi =
(
B−Xii + πi(X−i)
−1πi
)−Xi
, i ∈ I.
The following lemma provides upper bounds for the functional F .
Lemma 2.1. For each i ∈ I, it holds that Fi(X) ≺Xi Bi, as well as
Fi(X) ≺Xi πiX−iπi  X−i.
Proof. For the first part of the lemma, we readily have that B−Xii ≺Xi B−Xii + πi(X−i)−1πi,
which implies the order
Fi(X) =
(
B−Xii + πi(X−i)
−1πi
)−Xi ≺Xi Bi, ∀i ∈ I.
For the second order, we first show that
(2.3) (πiX−iπi)
−Xi  πi(X−i)−1πi
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holds for each i ∈ I. Indeed, upon rearranging the columns and rows of X−i bringing the
submatrix corresponding to Ki on the left top, write X−i and X
−1
−i in block format as
X−i =
(
A C
C ′ B
)
, X−1−i =
(
D F
F ′ E
)
where A and D are (Ki ×Ki)-dimensional. Since(
A C
C ′ B
)(
D F
F ′ E
)
=
(
AD + CF ′ AF + CE
C ′D +BF ′ C ′F +BE
)
,
the fact that X−iX
−1
−i is the identity matrix gives:
AF + CE = 0 ⇒ F = −A−1CE
D = A−1 −A−1CF ′ = A−1 +A−1CEC ′A−1  A−1.
We then get (2.3), since
(πiX−iπi)
−Xi =
(
A−1 0
0 0
)

(
D 0
0 0
)
= πi(X−i)
−1πi.
Then, it follows from (2.3) that (πiX−iπi)
−Xi ≺ B−Xi + πi(X−i)−1πi. The latter gives that
Fi(X) =
(
B−Xii + πi(X−i)
−1πi
)−Xi ≺Xi πiX−iπi.

We can already see that there is no hope for equilibrium in the case where there exists at
least one asset that can be traded by at most two traders. This result is consistent with the
corresponding no-equilibrium result in two-trader markets (see for instance [Kyl89], [Vay99]
and [Viv11]).
Lemma 2.2. If |Ik| = 2 holds for some k ∈ K, there exists no Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that X∗ is Nash equilibrium, so that X∗ = F (X∗), and that Ik = {i, j} holds
for some k ∈ K and i, j ∈ I with i 6= j. If ek ∈ RK stands for the zero vector with entry 1
only in the kth coordinate, then (since πiek = ek = πjek), we get from Lemma 2.1 that
X∗i (k, k) = 〈ek,X∗i ek〉 <
〈
ek,X
∗
−iek
〉
= X∗−i(k, k) = X
∗
j (k, k).
A symmetric argument shows that X∗j (k, k) < X
∗
i (k, k), which leads to contradiction. 
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2.2. Existence of fixed points. Taking into account Lemma 2.2, we assume hereafter that
|Ik| ≥ 3 holds for all k ∈ K. Under that assumption and based on the characterisation of the
equilibrium negative demand slopes through (2.2), we first show that there always exists such
an equilibrium. The next step toward this goal is to show that functional F defined in (2.1)
is nondecreasing. For this, we need to extend the order  on ∏i∈I SXi≻ , by defining the order
X ≡ (Xi; i ∈ I)  (Yi; i ∈ I) ≡ Y ⇐⇒ Xi  Yi, ∀i ∈ I.
Since X  Y implies X−i  Y−i, for all i ∈ I, i.e., πi(Y−i)−1πi  πi(X−i)−1πi, it follows that
Fi(X) =
(
B−Xii + πi(X−i)
−1πi
)−Xi  (B−Xii + πi(Y−i)−1πi)−Xi = Fi(Y),
for all i ∈ I. Therefore,
(2.4) X ≡ (Xi; i ∈ I)  (Yi; i ∈ I) ≡ Y =⇒ F (X)  F (Y),
which means that F is nondecreasing. Furthermore, Lemma 2.1 gives
(2.5) F (X)  B, ∀X ≡ (Xi; i ∈ I) ∈
∏
i∈I
S
Xi
≻ ,
where B ≡ (Bi; i ∈ I).
Define now the two sets:
(2.6) L :=
{
X ∈
∏
i∈I
S
Xi
≻ | X  F (X)
}
, U :=
{
X ∈
∏
i∈I
S
Xi
≻ | F (X)  X
}
and note that L ∩ U coincides with the set of fixed points of F . From (2.5), we obtain that
tB ∈ U, for all t ∈ [1,∞). The next result is complementary.
Lemma 2.3. There exists Z ∈∏i∈I SXi≻ with Z  B and with the property that rZi ≺Xi Fi(rZ)
for all i ∈ I and r ∈ (0, 1]; in particular, rZ ∈ L, for all r ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Pick α > 0 small enough so that
4απi  Bi, ∀i ∈ I.
Let Zi = απi, for all i ∈ I, and note that Z  (1/4)B  B. The fact that |Ik \ {i} | ≥ 2 holds
for all k ∈ K implies
Z−i = α
∑
i∈I\{i}
πj  2αidX .
Fix r ∈ (0, 1]. Since B−Xii  (4α)−1πi, we have
B−Xii + πi(rZ−i)
−1πi  1
2α
(
1
2
+
1
r
)
πi =
2 + r
2rα
πi.
for all i ∈ I. Therefore, we obtain that
Fi(rZ) =
(
B−Xii + πi(rZ−i)
−1πi
)−Xi  2
2 + r
rαπi ≻Xi rZi
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for all i ∈ I, which in particular shows that rZ  F (rZ), i.e., rZ ∈ L. 
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that X ∈ U and Y ∈ L are such that Y  X, and form sequences
(Xn; n ∈ N) and (Yn; n ∈ N) via Xn := F ◦n(X) and Yn := F ◦n(Y) for n ∈ N. Then:
(1) The sequence (Xn; n ∈ N) is nondecreasing, the sequence (Yn; n ∈ N) is nonincreas-
ing, and Yn  Xn holds for all n ∈ N; in particular, the limits X∗ := limn→∞Xn ∈∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ and Y
∗ := limn→∞Y
n ∈∏i∈I SXi≻ exist, and satisfy Y  Y∗  X∗  X.
(2) It holds that X∗ = F (X∗) and Y∗ = F (Y∗), i.e., X∗ and Y∗ are equilibrium price
impacts.
(3) Whenever Z ∈∏i∈I SXi≻ is such that Z = F (Z) and Y  Z  X, then Y∗  Z  X∗
Proof. Applying F iteratively to the inequality Y  X, and using the facts that X ∈ U and
Y ∈ L and the monotonicity property (2.4), the claims of statement (1) immediately follow.
Since the monotone limits X∗ := limn→∞X
n andY∗ := limn→∞Y
n exist and are
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ -
valued, continuity of F gives
X∗ = lim
n→∞
Xn = lim
n→∞
F (Xn−1) = F ( lim
n→∞
Xn−1) = F (X∗),
and similarly that Y∗ = F (Y∗), which is statement (2).
Finally, take Z ∈ L ∩ U with Y  Z  X. Using the results and notation of statements
(1) and (2) with (Y,Z) replacing (Y,X), we obtain Y∗  Z∗ = Z. Similarly, with (Z,X)
replacing (Y,X), we obtain Z = Z∗  X∗. 
The next result shows in particular that a globally maximal solution to (2.2) exists.
Lemma 2.5. Let X = B. Form a sequence (Xn; n ∈ N) via Xn = F ◦n(X), for all n ∈ N.
Then, the limit X∗ := limn→∞X
n ∈ ∏i∈I SXi≻ exists, it holds that X∗ = F (X∗), and for any
Y ∈ L it holds that Y  X∗.
Proof. Recall that X = B ∈ U and that there exist Z ∈ L with Z  X by Lemma 2.3.
Therefore, Lemma 2.4 gives that X∗ exists and F (X∗) = X∗. If Y ∈ L, then Y  F (Y) 
B = X, and Lemma 2.4 gives that Y  X∗. 
2.3. Uniqueness of the fixed point. Lemma 2.5 in fact shows that a maximal solution
X∗ of (2.2) exists; combined with Lemma 2.4, it follow that, whenever Y ∈ L, there exists a
minimal solution of (2.2) that is dominated below by Y and above by X∗. By Lemma 2.3,
there exists Z ∈ ∏i∈I SXi≻ such that rZ ∈ L, for all r ∈ (0, 1]. We shall show below that the
minimal fixed point dominated below by rZ coincides with X∗ for all r ∈ (0, 1]; since r ∈ (0, 1]
is arbitrary, this will also imply (global) uniqueness of the fixed point.
In the sequel, along with the maximal solution X∗ = (X∗i ; i ∈ I) to (2.2) of Lemma 2.5,
we take Z ∈∏i∈I SXi≻ as in Lemma 2.3, fix r ∈ (0, 1], and let X ≡ (Xi; i ∈ I) be the minimal
fixed point that is bounded below by rZ. We shall show that, necessarily, X = X∗.
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Define H := X∗−X; from statement (3) of Lemma 2.5, Hi := (X∗i −Xi) ∈ S, for all i ∈ I.
Furthermore, pick small enough ǫ > 0 such that rZ  X− ǫH,which is possible by statement
(3) of Lemma 2.5, which implies that rZi ≺Xi Fi(rZ)  Xi holds for all i ∈ I. Consider the
mapping
[−ǫ, 1] ∋ t 7→ X(t) := (X+ tH) ∈
∏
i∈I
S
Xi
≻ ,
and note that X(0) = X and X(1) = X∗.
It follows directly from definition of functional F , that the mapping
(−ǫ, 1) ∋ t 7→ Φ(t) ≡ F (X(t)) ∈
∏
i∈I
S
Xi
≻
is twice continuously differentiable. The next result shows that it is, in fact, “concave”.
Lemma 2.6. With Φ(t) := F (X(t)) for t ∈ (−ǫ, 1), it holds that
−∂
2Φ(t)
∂t2
∈
∏
i∈I
S, ∀t ∈ (−ǫ, 1).
It follows that the mapping (−ǫ, 1) ∋ t 7→ −∂Φ(t)/∂t is nondecreasing in the order of (S)I .
Proof. For all t ∈ (−ǫ, 1) and i ∈ I, it holds that
∂
∂t
X−i(t)
−1 = −X−i(t)−1
(
∂
∂t
X−i(t)
)
X−i(t)
−1 = −X−i(t)−1H−iX−i(t)−1.
Since Φi(t) =
(
(Bi)
−Xi + πiX−i(t)
−1πi
)−Xi ∈ SXi≻ holds for t ∈ (−ǫ, 1) and i ∈ I, it follows
that
∂Φi(t)
∂t
= −Φi(t)
(
∂
∂t
(
Φi(t)
−Xi
))
Φi(t)
= −Φi(t)
(
πi
∂
∂t
X−i(t)
−1πi
)
Φi(t)
= Φi(t)πiX−i(t)
−1H−iX−i(t)
−1πiΦi(t)
= Φi(t)X−i(t)
−1H−iX−i(t)
−1Φi(t),
where the last line follows because Φi(t)πi = Φi(t) = πiΦi(t). Call
t ∋ (−ǫ, 1) 7→ Di(t) := X−i(t)−1H−iX−i(t)−1 ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ I.
Since X−i(t)Di(t)X−i(t) = H−i is a constant matrix as a function of t ∈ (−ǫ, 1), we obtain(
∂
∂t
X−i(t)
)
Di(t)X−i(t) +X−i(t)
(
∂
∂t
Di(t)
)
X−i(t) +X−i(t)Di(t)
(
∂
∂t
X−i(t)
)
= 0,
i.e.,
H−iDi(t)X−i(t) +X−i(t)
(
∂
∂t
Di(t)
)
X−i(t) +X−i(t)Di(t)H−i(t) = 0,
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which gives
∂
∂t
Di(t) = −X−i(t)−1H−iDi(t)−Di(t)H−iX−i(t)−1
= −2X−i(t)−1H−iX−1−i (t)H−iX−i(t)−1
= −2Di(t)X−i(t)Di(t).
Therefore, since ∂Φi(t)/∂t = Φi(t)Di(t)Φi(t), we obtain
∂2Φi(t)
∂t2
=
∂Φi(t)
∂t
Di(t)Φi(t) + Φi(t)
(
∂Di(t)
∂t
)
Φi(t) + Φi(t)Di(t)
∂Φi(t)
∂t
= 2Φi(t)Di(t)Φi(t)Di(t)Φi(t)− 2Φi(t)Di(t)X−i(t)Di(t)Φi(t)
= −2Φi(t)Di(t)(X−i(t)− Φi(t))Di(t)Φi(t).
From Lemma 2.1, we have that Φi(t)  X−i(t). Also, since Φi(t)Di(t) ∈ S, it is clear that
−∂
2Φi(t)
∂t2
∈ S, ∀ t ∈ (−ǫ, 1) and ∀ i ∈ I.
For −ǫ ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ 1, the above implies that
∂Φi(t)
∂t
∣∣∣
t=t1
− ∂Φi(t)
∂t
∣∣∣
t=t2
=
∫ t2
t1
−∂
2Φi(t)
∂t2
dt ∈ S, ∀i ∈ I,
completing the argument. 
Lemma 2.7. For s ∈ [−ǫ, 0), it holds that X(s) ∈ U, i.e., F (X(s))  X(s).
Proof. Note that
H = X∗ −X = F (X(1)) − F (X(0)) =
∫ 1
0
∂F (X(t))
∂t
dt.
In view of the fact that (−ǫ, 1) ∋ t 7→ −∂F (X(t))/∂t is nondecreasing as follows from Lemma
2.6, we have
H =
∫ 1
0
∂F (X(t))
∂t
dt  1
s
∫ s
0
∂F (X(t))
∂t
dt =
1
s
(F (X(s))− F (X(0))) , s ∈ (0, 1].
Therefore,
∂F (X(s))
∂s
∣∣∣
s=0
= lim
s↓0
F (X(s)) − F (X(0))
s
 H.
Using again the fact that (−ǫ, 1) ∋ t 7→ −∂F (X(t))/∂t is nondecreasing, which implies that
∂F (X(t))/∂t  H holds for all t ∈ (−ǫ, 0), we obtain
X− F (X(s)) = F (X(0)) − F (X(s)) =
∫ 0
s
∂F (X(t))
∂t
dt  −sH, ∀ s ∈ [−ǫ, 0),
which shows that F (X(s))  X+ sH = X(s) holds for s ∈ [−ǫ, 0). 
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We are now ready to complete the proof of uniqueness. Recall that ǫ > 0 was picked such
that rZ  X(−ǫ). Since additionally rZ ∈ L and X(−ǫ) ∈ U, Lemma 2.4 gives existence
of a fixed point Y with the property rZ  Y  X(−ǫ). Since X is the smallest fixed point
dominated below by rZ, this would give X  Y which together with Y  X − ǫH and
H ∈∏i∈I S gives H = 0, i.e., X = X∗.
2.4. Convergence to solutions through iteration. Now that uniqueness has been estab-
lished, we can show that the iterative procedure will always converge to the unique root and
hence finish the proof of Theorem 1.4.
Lemma 2.8. For an arbitrary X0 ∈ ∏i∈I SXi≻ , form a sequence (Xn; n ∈ N) by induction,
asking that Xn = F (Xn−1), for all n ∈ N. Then, it holds that
lim
n→∞
Xn = X∗.
Furthermore, if X0 ∈ L, the sequence (Xn; n ∈ N) is nondecreasing, while if X0 ∈ U, the
sequence (Xn; n ∈ N) is nonincreasing.
Proof. If X0 ∈ L, the inequality X0  F (X0) = X1 and the monotonicity of F of the form
(2.4) show by induction that (Xn; n ∈ N) is nondecreasing. Similarly, ifX0 ∈ U, the inequality
X1 = F (X0)  X0 and the monotonicity of F show that (Xn; n ∈ N) is nonincreasing.
Given an arbitrary X0 ∈ ∏i∈I SXi≻ , recall that Lemma 2.1 implies that tB ∈ U for all
t ∈ [1,∞) and that Lemma 2.3 guarantees the existence of Z ∈ ∏i∈I SXi≻ , such that Z  B
and rZ ∈ L for all r ∈ (0, 1]. Pick rˆ ∈ (0, 1] sufficiently small and tˆ ∈ [1,∞) sufficiently large
such that
W0 := rˆZ  X0  tˆB =: Y0
holds. Then, define the sequences (Wn; n ∈ N) and (Yn; n ∈ N) by iteration via F , that is
Wn := F(Wn−1) and Yn := F(Yn−1), for each n ∈ N. Since W0  X0  Y0, monotonicity
of F and induction gives Wn  Xn  Yn, for each n ∈ N. Also, since W0 ∈ L and Y0 ∈ U,
the sequence (Wn; n ∈ N) is nondecreasing and, in fact, bounded above by Y0, while the
sequence (Yn; n ∈ N) is nonincreasing and bounded below by W0. It follows that both
sequences have limits W∞ and Y∞, respectively, with W∞  Y∞. Continuity of F gives
thatW∞ = F (W∞) andY∞ = F (Y∞), exactly as in the proof of Lemma 2.5. By uniqueness
of the solution to (2.2), it follows that W∞ = X∗ = Y∞, from which it further follows that
limn→∞X
n = X∗. 
2.5. The proof of Proposition 1.5. As discussed above, the main input of our market model
is the traders’ covariance matrices, properly scaled with their risk tolerance coefficients. The
next auxiliary result, related to [MR17, Proposition 1, item (iv)], implies that the equilibrium
price impacts are monotonically increasing with respect to these matrices.
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Lemma 2.9. Let B1 = (B1i ; i ∈ I) ∈
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ and B
2 = (B2i ; i ∈ I) ∈
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ be such that
B1  B2. If X1 = (X1i ; i ∈ I) ∈
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ and X
2 = (X2i ; i ∈ I) ∈
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ stand for the
associated unique equilibria, then X1  X2.
Proof. Set F 2 to be as in (2.2) with B2 in place of B there, and note that
X1i = ((B
1
i )
−Xi + πi(X
1
−i)
−1πi)
−Xi  ((B2i )−Xi + πi(X1−i)−1πi)−Xi = F 2i (X1), i ∈ I,
which shows that X1  F 2(X1). Then, statement (3) of Lemma 2.5 shows that X1  X2. 
We are now in position to complete the proof of Proposition 1.5. By monotonicity from
Lemma 2.9 and the nondecreasing assumption of (Bn0 ; n ∈ N), we have that (Xn; n ∈ N) is
also nondecreasing in
∏
i∈I S
Xi
≻ . Furthermore, from Lemma 2.1 we have that
Xni  Bi, ∀i ∈ I \ {0}
and also that
Xn0  Xn−0 
∑
i∈I\{0}
Bi.
It follows that (Xn; n ∈ N) has a monotone limit X∞ ∈∏i∈I SXi≻ . Since limn→∞(Bn0 )−X0 = 0,
condition (1.5) in the limit gives that
X∞0 = lim
n→∞
Xn0 = lim
n→∞
(
(Bn0 )
−X0 + π0(X
n
−0)
−1π0
)−X0
=
(
π0(X
∞
−0)
−1π0
)−X0 .
The same limiting argument shows that
X∞i =
(
B−Xii + πi
(
X∞−i
)−1
πi
)−Xi
, i ∈ I
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